In a long series of action some
will languish with fatigue, and some be drawn of
by present gratifications; some will loiter because
others labour, and some will cease to labour because
others loiter: and if once they come within prospect
of success and profit, some will be greedy and
others envious; some will undertake more than they
can perform, to enlarge their claims of advantage;
some will perform less than they undertake, lest
their labours should chiefly turn to the benefit of
others.
The history of mankind informs us that a single
power is very seldom broken by a confederacy. States
of different interests, and aspects malevolent to each
other, may be united for a time by common distress;
and in the ardour of self-preservation fall unanimously
upon an enemy, by whom they are all equally
endangered. But if their first attack can be
withstood, time will never fail to dissolve their union:
success and miscarriage will be equally destructive:
after the conquest of a province, they will quarrel in
the division; after the loss of a battle, all will be
endeavouring to secure themselves by abandoning
the rest.
From the impossibility of confining numbers to
the constant and uniform prosecution of a common
interest, arises the difficulty of securing subjects
against the encroachment of governours.
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